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Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court: Determining the 
Retroactive Applicability of Montana’s DNA Statute to Offenses 




Oral arguments are set for April 18, 2018, at 10:30 AM in the 





This is a case of first impression in Montana.1 At issue is whether 
the Montana Legislature’s 2007 amendment to section 45–1–205(9) of the 
Montana Code Annotated, permitting prosecution within one year 
following conclusive identification by DNA for specific sexual crimes, 
can be applied retroactively as to Petitioner Ronald Tipton (“Tipton”) 
when the applicable statute of limitations ran prior to the amendment’s 
enactment.2 Tipton argues in effect that since the applicable statute of 
limitations ran in 2001, his subsequent prosecution based on the 2007 
amendment to § 45–1–205(9) is prohibited because, since the statute of 
limitations in his case had previously run, he has a vested right to be free 
from prosecution based on the ex post facto clauses in the U.S. and 
Montana Constitutions.3 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 20, 1987, a 10-year-old girl was the victim of sexual 
intercourse without consent.4 The applicable statute of limitations was five 
years from the date of the offense.5 In 1988, following an investigation and 
prosecution, the State sentenced another man, Jimmy Bromgard, to prison 
for the crime.6   
In 1989, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the 
Legislature amended the relevant statute of limitations to allow for the 
                                                 
1 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 1, Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0678%20Writ%20-
%20Supervisory%20Control%20--%20Petition?id={D0E8C05F-0000-C015-9384-
F37DEDD1A558} (Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (No. OP 17-0678). 
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–205(9) (2017). 
3 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 5–9; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. 
CONST art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31. 
4 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District 
Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0678%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20--
%20Response/Objection?id={90B04761-0000-CB1A-AB0D-658808F2EAE1} (Mont. Jan. 29, 
2018) (No. OP 17-0678). 
5 Id. at 3; § 45–5–503(3) (1985). 
6 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 2, 17–18. 
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commencement of prosecution up to five years after the victim’s 18th 
birthday.7 Because the victim turned 18 in May of 1996, the statute of 
limitations conclusively expired in May of 2001, five years later.8  
In 2001, the Legislature again amended the applicable statute of 
limitations to allow for the commencement of prosecution up to ten years 
after the victim’s 18th birthday, effective October 1, 2001.9 This 
amendment did not affect Tipton because the applicable statute of 
limitations had expired prior to the amendment’s October 2001 effective 
date.10  
In 2002, DNA evidence exonerated Bromgard, and the case went 
unresolved.11 
In 2007, the Legislature added a section pertaining to DNA 
evidence to the general statute of limitations.12 It provided that: 
If a suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing 
after a time period prescribed [for sexual intercourse 
without consent with a minor victim] has expired, a 
prosecution may be commenced within 1 year after the 
suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing.13 
In 2015, the State matched Tipton’s DNA, collected in an 
unrelated matter, to the DNA evidence preserved from the unresolved 
1987 rape.14 The State commenced prosecution within one year.15  
Tipton moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the statute of 
limitations had expired.16 On November 6, 2017, the district court denied 
Tipton’s motion.17 Tipton then petitioned for a Writ of Supervisory 
Control requesting dismissal of his charges.18  
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Petitioner Tipton 
 
 Tipton rests his argument on the long-established principle that 
when the statute of limitations expires, it confers a vested right to be free 
from subsequent prosecution.19 Tipton argues that once a prosecution is 
time-barred, it cannot be revived through amendment of the statute of 
                                                 
7  Id. at 3; § 45–1–205(1)(b) (1989). 
8  Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 1. 
9  Id. 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 2. 
12 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 2. 
13 Id.; § 45–1–205(9) (2017). 
14 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 19. 
15 Id. at 2. 
16 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 2. 
17 Id. at 4–5. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. at 7. 
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limitations.20 Tipton asserts that he was free from prosecution after May, 
2001, when the applicable statute of limitations had conclusively run.21 
The Legislature’s later amendment to the statute of limitations in 2007 
extending the time for prosecution following the discovery of DNA 
evidence did not impact Tipton’s vested right to be free from prosecution 
after May, 2001.22  
To support his argument, Tipton points to the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws found in similar provisions in the U.S. and Montana 
Constitutions.23 The latter provides, “[n]o ex post facto law nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of 
special privilege, franchises, or immunities shall be passed by the 
legislature.”24 Tipton agrees that the clauses’ prohibitions against ex post 
facto laws permit prosecution when the Legislature extends a statute of 
limitations before the statute has expired. However, he asserts that when 
the Legislature does so after the statute has expired, the clauses prohibit 
prosecution.25 This is because “‘to resurrect a prosecution after the 
relevant statute of limitations has expired, it is to eliminate a currently 
existing conclusive presumption from forbidding prosecution.’”26 
 
B. Respondents Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court and 
Honorable Mary Jane Knisely 
 
 Respondents begin by asserting that § 45–1–205(9) can be applied 
retroactively because it meets the standard set forth under § 1–2–109, 
which provides that “[n]o law contained in any of the statues of Montana 
are retroactive unless expressly so declared.”27 Respondents argue that 
because § 45–1–205(9) permits prosecution after the original statute of 
limitations has run following the discovery of new DNA evidence, it is 
inherently retroactive under the meaning of § 1–2–109 based on its plain 
language.28 Respondents then state that a statute is impermissibly 
retroactive under § 1–2–109 only when it “‘takes away or impairs vested 
rights, acquired under existing laws.’”29 Thus, Respondents conclude that 
because an amendment of a statute of limitations “affects only procedural 
matters and does not relate to substantive rights of a party,”30 the 2007 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1. 
22 Id. at 8–9. 
23 Id. at 6; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31. 
24 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31. 
25 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 7–9. 
26 Id. at 8 (quoting Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616 (2003)). 
27 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. at 8 (quoting Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 124 P.3d 132, 135 (citations omitted)). 
30 Id. (citing State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Sky Country, 78 P.2d 1135, 1137 (1989)). 
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amendment to § 45–1–205(9) is permissibly retroactive as applied to 
Tipton.31  
 Respondents then turn to the ex post facto provisions in both the 
U.S. and Montana Constitutions.32 First, Respondents concede that § 45–
1–205(9) is “technically unconstitutional as applied to Tipton,” citing 
Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court,33 which references 
Stogner v. California34 and holds that “[t]he prohibition against ex post 
facto laws found in both the United States and Montana Constitutions 
would prevent an amended statute of limitations from reviving a 
previously time-barred prosecution.”35 Astonishingly, Respondents then 
“request[] this Court to find an exception” to the constitutional principle 
described in Stogner.36  
 To support this request, Respondents point to the policy behind 
the DNA statute, that society has a great interest in prosecuting individuals 
identified conclusively by DNA evidence for sexual crimes.37 
Respondents initially cite the four categories of ex post facto laws 
described in Stogner,38 but then they confuse the issues by inaccurately 
treating the four categories as factors when only the second category is 
presently at issue.39 Respondents assert that the second factor (category) 
asks whether “the law makes the punishment for the crime more 
burdensome,” claiming that the punishment here is not more burdensome 
because Tipton was charged under the 1987 law.40 
In conclusion, Respondents summarize that, since the intent of the 
Legislature in amending § 45–1–205(9) was to “allow the State to 
prosecute unsolvable sexually violent crimes with the power of DNA” if 
the State commenced prosecution within one year following DNA 
identification, “fairness for the victim” justifies Respondents’ request to 




                                                 
31 Id. at 8–9. 
32 Id. at 11. 
33 177 P.3d 439 (2008). 
34 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
35 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 12–13 (quoting Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443 
(citations omitted)). 
36 Id. at 13. 
37 Id. at 13–14. 
38 Id. at 10–11 (quoting Stogner, 539 U.S. at 612 (the four categories are “1st Every law that makes 
an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the 
offence, in order to convict the offender.”)). 
39 Id. at 15–16. 
40 Id. at 15. 
41 Id. at 19–20. 
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 Respondents misconstrue the meaning of “retroactive” under § 1–
2–109 by implying that since § 45–1–205(9) is permissibly retroactive-
looking under the 2007 amendment, it must permissibly apply 
retroactively to Tipton.42 However, Respondents’ interpretation glances 
over the fact that the applicable statute of limitations for Tipton had 
already run in 2001, six years before the amendment was enacted.  
As the Montana Supreme Court explains in Mordja, under § 1–2–
109, “a statute is not ‘retroactive’ merely because it draws upon antecedent 
facts for its operation,” but that “a statute is ‘retroactive’ in a legal sense 
‘which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws 
or creates a new obligation.’”43 Thus, whether a statute is “retroactive” 
under § 1–2–109 depends on first, whether a defendant “has any vested 
right in the statute of limitations,” and second, whether the amendment in 
question “impairs or strips [the defendant’s] vested rights.”44 
 The Montana Supreme Court answers the first question by 
confirming whether the applicable statute of limitations has run; where it 
has, the defendant has a vested right to be free from prosecution.45 The 
Court answers the second question by referencing Stogner, where a 
defendant’s vested right in an expired statute of limitations was 
impermissibly impaired by an amendment to the statute of limitations 
which revived previously time-barred prosecutions.46 There, the 
amendment “violated the ex post facto clause because it inflicted 
punishment upon [the defendant] where, by law, he was not liable to any 
punishment,” falling under the second category of ex post facto laws.47 
Notably, this directly contradicts Respondents’ “more burdensome” 
interpretation of the second category, despite Respondents having used the 
same case for their argument.48 To be clear, this second category of ex post 
facto laws includes “[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed,” or in other words, a law that “inflicts 
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.”49 
Under this category, the Court concluded that “[t]he prohibition against ex 
post facto laws…prevent[s] an amended statute of limitations from 
reviving a previously time-barred prosecution,” because a defendant has a 
vested right in the expiration of a statute of limitations.50  
Thus, a statute can be “retroactive” under § 1–2–109 as applied to 
a defendant when first, the applicable statute of limitations has 
                                                 
42 Id. at 6–9. 
43 Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, 177 P.3d 439, 442 (2008) (quoting State v. 
Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1012 (1979) (reversed in part on other grounds)). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 443. 
46 Id. (referencing 539 U.S. 607). 
47 Id. (citing Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 613 (2003)). 
48 Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 15–16. 
49 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8; Stogner, 539 U.S. at 613 (quoting and 
adding emphasis to Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798)). 
50 Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443. 
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conclusively run, and second, the statute is later amended and prosecution 
commenced against the defendant when by law, the defendant is no longer 
liable to any punishment.51 This is exactly Tipton’s situation: in May, 
2001, the applicable statute of limitations conclusively ran and Tipton was 
no longer liable under law to punishment for the 1987 rape. Therefore, § 
1–2–109 is “retroactive” as applied to Tipton under established Montana 
precedent.52  
This is distinguishable from a hypothetical situation where, before 
a statute of limitations has expired in a given case, the statute is amended 
to extend to a later point in time.53 This is because “the amendment of an 
unexpired statute of limitations does not affect a vested right, and therefore 
does not violate due process or the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws.”54 In summary, the Montana Supreme Court has held that “where a 
statute is amended to extend the limitations period for a criminal offense, 
the extended limitations period applies to all offenses not barred at the time 
the amendment was enacted.”55 Conversely, the extended limitations 
period does not apply to any offense already time-barred on the date the 
amendment was enacted.  
 Tipton was vested with the right to be free from prosecution when 
the applicable statute of limitations ran in 2001. The Legislature’s 
amendment of § 45–1–205(9) in 2007 did not affect Tipton’s 
constitutionally provided right to be free from prosecution conferred by 
the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Montana Constitutions.56 Thus, 
the Court will all but certainly reverse the district court and remand for 
dismissal.   
                                                 
51 Id. at 442; Stogner, 539 U.S. at 610. 
52 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8–9; Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443. 
53 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
54 Id. at 6–7; Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443. 
55 Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443–44. 
56 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31. 
